On the decision making problem in Dempster-Shafer theory / 91-172 by Ma, Yong et al.


Faculty Working Paper 91-0172
330
B385
1991:172 COPY 2
STX
On the Decision Making Problem
Dempster-Shafer Theory
Mar t u Ity
Yong Ma
Department of Computer Science
University of Illinois
John S. Chandler
Officefor Information Management
University of Illinois
David C Wilkins
Department of Computer Science
University of Illinois
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER MO. 91-0172
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at (Jrbana-Champaign
October 1991
On the Decision Making Problem in
Dempster-Shafer Theory
Yong Ma
Department of Computer Science, University of Illinois
405 North Mathews Avenue, Urbana, EL 61801, USA
yongma@cs.uiuc.edu, (217) 244-1620
John S. Chandler
Office for Information Management, University of Illinois
1407 West Gregory Drive, Urbana, EL 61801, USA
chandle7j@vmd.cs0.uiuc.edu, (217) 244-0812
David C. Wilkins
Department of Computer Science, University of Illinois
405 North Mathews Avenue, Urbana, EL 61801, USA
wilkins@cs.uiuc.edu, (217) 333-2822
Topic: Reasoning under Uncertainty, Expert Systems, Diagnosis.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/ondecisionmaking91172mayo
Abstract
A decision making procedure is an essential component of any evidential reasoning
system under uncertainty. That is, after the system gathers and combines all of
the available information, a decision has to be made as the final output (e.g.,
diagnosis.) In probability theory, for example, a final decision is the hypothesis
with the highest probability. Unfortunately, in Dempster-Shafer theory, one has
more difficulties deciding the final output since more uncertainty is retained,
even in the combination process of evidence. As the matter of fact, the effective
decision making procedure remains an open problem for Dempster-Shafer theory.
In this paper, we present a solution to this problem. The solution is composed of
theoretical analysis and the construction of a heuristic decision making procedure.
In theoretical analysis, we first present some formal relationships among ordered
hypotheses and then derive the sufficient conditions under which a final decision
making choice is sound. When the sufficient conditions are not met, heuristic
combination functions are proposed to make the final choice. Finally, based on
the theoretical derivations and the heuristic combination functions proposed, a
decision making algorithm is given for the theory.

1 Introduction
Reasoning under uncertainty has been widely and extensively investigated in
artificial intelligence and other related fields. Researchers in these fields have
developed many methods to represent uncertain knowledge and draw inferences
from them. Among these methods are the certainty factor model in MYCIN
[Buchanan and Shortliffe, 1984], Bayesian probability theory (as in PROSPEC-
TOR) [Duda et al., 1976], belief networks [Pearl, 1986b, Pearl, 1986a], Dempster-
Shafer's evidence theory [Shafer, 1976, Gordon and Shortliffe, 1985], and Zadeh's
possibility theory (fuzzy logic) [Zadeh, 1979]. One of the key issues for all of these
methods is determining a decision making procedure; that is, after an expert sys-
tem gathers and combines all of the available information, a decision has to be
made as the final output (e.g., diagnosis.) In probability theory, for example, a
final decision is the hypothesis with the highest probability. Unfortunately, in
Dempster-Shafer theory, one has more difficulties deciding the final output since
more uncertainty is retained, even in the combination process of evidence. As the
matter of fact, the effective decision making procedure remains an open problem
for Dempster-Shafer theory. It is this problem for Dempster-Shafer theory that
constitutes the topic of this paper.
Dempster-Shafer theory is one of the major paradigms for reasoning under un-
certainty and it has been actively and extensively explored in many perspectives
[Halpern and Fagin, 1990, Fagin and Halpern, 1989, Fagin and Halpern, 1990,
Smets, 1990]. There are also some work on moving the theory into practical uses
[Shafer and Logan, 1987, Saffiotti, 1990, Deutsch-McLeish et al., 1990]. There-
fore, the framework to be proposed for the decision making procedure will be an
important and useful ingredient of the use and development of the theory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After Dempster-Shafer
theory is briefly introduced in Section 2, the decision making problem is identi-
fied and discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, some formal relationships among
hypotheses are presented and proved. In Section 5, the sufficient conditions for
sound decision making are derived based on the formal relationships among hy-
potheses and some intuitive observations about the decision making processes.
When the sufficient conditions are not satisfied for some cases, a heuristic combi-
nation function is proposed to make the final choice. The properties; or forms; of
these functions are discussed. From the theoretical derivations and the heuristic
proposal, an effective decision making algorithm is given, along with some com-
ments. Finally, in Section 6, some concluding remarks are made and possible
future studies are identified.
2 Dempster-Shafer Theory
Let be a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions about a do-
main, e.g., a set of hypotheses for a diagnostic system. is called the frame
of discernment. Let 2 denote the set of all subsets of 0. Elements of 2®, i.e.,
subsets of 0, are the general propositions in the domain with which the theory is
concerned. Three basic functions are to be defined: the basic probability assign-
ment m, the belief function Bel, and the plausibility function PL They all define
a numerical quantity between and 1 to indicate the degree of support provided
to a proposition by the piece of available evidence; their domain is 2 and their
range is [0, 1].
A function m : 2 —> [0,1] is a basic probability assignment if it satisfies
m(0) = and £ m (A ) = L (*)
AC©
The quantity, m(A), represents the exact belief committed in the proposition
represented by A. Therefore, if
m(G) = 1 and for all A ^ G, m(A) = 0, A C (2)
then a piece of evidence is certain, in that the decision making output must be
one of the elements in set G. However, it does not necessarily say which element
of G, unless G is a singleton set. On the other hand, the case in which G =
tells us nothing, i.e., it represents a situation of total ignorance or total lack of
knowledge.
The belief function Bel : 2 —» [0, 1] can be defined in terms of m
Bel(A) = Y, m (B ) for ACQ (3)
BCA
In fact, Shafer has shown that the basic probability assignment that produces a
given belief function is unique and can be recovered from the belief function by
the following formulae.
tn(A) = £ (-l) ]A - Bl Bel(B) for ACQ (4)
BCA
where \X\ is the cardinality of the set X. Therefore, there is a one-to-one corre-
spondence between basic probability assignments and belief functions.
Finally the plausibility function PI : 2 — [0, l] is denned to be
Pl(A) = 1 - Bel(-^A) for ACQ (5)
It can be shown that the plausibility function PI carries exactly the same infor-
mation as 77i and Bel do.
Now let us see what those quantities intuitively mean although they are
all equivalent in terms of information. If we think of the elements as points,
m(A),A C 0, measures the total probability mass constrained to stay in A but
not confined to any proper subset of A. It represents our ignorance of not being
able to subdivide our belief to any subsets of A. Then the quantity, Bel(A), is
the measure of the total probability mass constrained to stay somewhere in A.
Since Bel(-^A) is the measure of the probability mass constrained to stay out of
A, Pl(A) = 1 — Bel(->A), is the measure of the total probability mass that can
move into A (some of which is already in A if Bel(A) > 0.) To put it other way,
Bel(A) is the measure of the lower probability of A and Pl(A) is the measure of
the upper probability of A. Hence, an interval notation, [Bel(A), Pl{A)\, is often
used to represent the range of the probability of A.
Next we look at how the various distinct pieces of evidence are combined,
i.e., how the fundamental operation of uncertainty reasoning is accomplished in
Dempster-Shafer theory. Let mi and ra 2 be two basic probability assignments
representing two uncertain pieces of evidence for the same frame of discernment,
0. Dempster's combination rule; which is a generalization of Bayes' rule com-
putes a new basic probability assignment, denoted 771! © m 2 , that represents the
combined effect of m^ and m2 as follows.
m(0) =
m(A) = K Y. rn l {X)-m 2{Y),ACO,A^® (6)
XnY=A
K = J
1 - £;rny=0 rn l(X)m 2 {Y)
The purpose of K is to redistribute the belief committed to by the intersection
operation to other non-empty non-zero belief subsets; namely; the normalization
step; in order to make m 1 ©T7i2 an eligible basic probability assignment. Therefore,
if 1 — Y^xnY=o rni(^)Tn2(Y) = 0? then rai © m2 does not exist. This occurs
when the combined belief functions invest no belief in intersecting sets, and mi
and m 2 are said to be totally or flatly contradictory. The quantity log(K) =
Con(Beli, Bel2 ) is called the weight of conflict between Bel\ and Bel2 .
If vn\ © m 2 exists for given m^ and m 2 , the corresponding belief function,
Beli © Bel2 , and the plausibility function, Pli © Pl2 , are then easily computed
from mi © m 2 by the definitions.
An important property of Dempster's rule is that it is commutative and as-
sociative. This is desirable because evidence aggregation should be independent
of the order of its gathering.
3 The Decision Making Problem for the Theory
The problem of an effective decision making procedure for Dempster-Shafer the-
ory has been recognized by several researchers:
"Dempster and Shafer's theory of plausible inference provides a
methodology for the representation and combination of evidence.
However, several questions need to be addressed before it can be
used effectively for AI applications. Perhaps, the most pressing
problem is that no effective decision making procedure is available."
[Bhatnagar and Kanal, 1986](p. 24).
"However, more work needs to be done with this theory before it is
on a solid foundation. Several problems remain as obvious topics for
future research. Perhaps the most pressing is that no effective decision
making procedure is available." [Barnett, 198l](p. 874).
The concern of the problem is that, when it comes to make a decision, which of the
estimates provided by m, Bel, PI should be used. If we have hi : [0.5, 0.8] and
/i 2 : [0.4, 0.9], which one of hi and h 2 should be chosen as the final output? The
difficulty of the decision stems from the fact that although Bel(hi) is greater than
£?e/(/i2), Pl(hi) is less than Pl(h 2 ). It is indeed a very important problem because
an expert system has to make a decision at the end of information gathering and
aggregation.
Why is it a problem for Dempster-Shafer theory? The difference between the
Bayesian approach and the Dempster-Shafer approach is that the former sup-
presses ignorance up front when prior probabilities are determined, while the lat-
ter represents ignorance and uncertainty explicitly and retains them through the
combination process. This may suggest one advantageous use of the Dempster-
Shafer approach; that is, we initially retain ignorance. As the evidence narrows
down the possibilities we may or may not have a decision. If not, we then apply
some ad hoc selective methods to make our final choice. In this paper, we at-
tempt to attack the problem by deriving the theoretical conditions under which
a sound decision can be made and by proposing heuristic combination functions
to accommodate other cases where the derived conditions are not satisfied.
4 Some Formal Relationships among Hypotheses
Before we can devise a decision making algorithm for Dempster-Shafer theory
we need to define some terms and prove some preliminary formal relationships
among hypotheses which are ordered by their current belief values.
Definition 4.1 (Largest Belief Subset) A subset A is said to be the largest
belief subset if the following conditions are satisfied by A.
• A is a proper subset of Q, that is, A C 0;
• Bel(A) > Bel(X) for all X C &
Clearly, would be the largest belief subset if A were not denned to be a
proper subset of 0. However, is not an interesting candidate for decision since
its selection is vacuous.
Definition 4.2 (Largest Belief with Minimum Element Subset) A sub-
set A of is said to be the largest belief with minimum element subset if
• A is the largest belief subset;
• No proper subset of A has the same belief value as A, that is, Bel(A) >
Bel(X) for all X C A.
Definition 4.3 (Largest Belief with Maximum Element Subset) A sub-
set A of is said to be the largest belief with maximum element subset if
• A is the largest belief subset;
• If there exists A' such that Bel(A') — Bel(A), then \A\ > \A'\; where \X\
is the cardinality of set X.
From these definitions, the existence can be shown of certain relationships
among these subsets.
4.1 Most specific hypotheses
Theorem 4.1 If A is the largest belief with minimum element subset of , B
the second largest belief with minimum element subset of Q, and A ^ B , then
exactly one of the following relations holds.
1. Be A.
2. AUB = 0.
Proof: We will prove it by contradiction. Assume that the claim were not true,
then we would have B (^ A and A U B ^ 0. From A ^ B and B (\ A, we
have AD B C B. By the definition of Bel(X), Bel(B) > Bel(A n B). But
Bel(B) ^ Bel(A D B), for, if they were equal, then An B would be the second
largest belief with minimum element subset by the definition, contrary to the
assumption that B was. Therefore,
Bel{B)> Bel(AHB). (7)
On the other hand,
Bel{AuB) = Bel{A) + Bel{B)-Bel(AnB)+ £ m(X) (8)
XCAuB,X<$A,X(XB
Since Bel(B) > Bel(A n B) and m(X) > 0, for allXCG,
Bel(A\JB) > Bel(A). (9)
From A ^ B and B $ A, we also have iU^Di Together with AU5/0,
AU B should be the largest belief with minimum element subset; a contradiction.
Now what is left to be shown is that one and only one of the two relations
holds. If B C A, then A U B = A. By definition of A, A ^ 0, thus AU B ^ Q.
If A U i? = 0, then it must be the case that B (X A; for, if not, then B C A and
AUl? = A^0by definition of A, contrary to the assumption that AU B = Q.
For the convenience later in the paper, the theorem is rewritten as the follow-
ing corollary.
Corollary 4.1 If A is the largest belief with minimum element subset ofQ, B
the second largest belief with minimum element subset of 0, and A ^ B , then
exactly one of the following relations holds.
1.BCA.
2. Ar\B = 0, and AU B = 0.
3. A n B ^ 0, and AU B = 0.
Proof: It is the immediate result of Theorem 4.1.
4.2 Most general hypotheses
Theorem 4.2 // A is the largest belief with maximum element subset of 0, B
the second largest belief with maximum element subset of 0, and A ^ B , then
exactly one of the following relations holds.
1. BC A.
2. AU B = 0.
Proof: By similar arguments, we would have
Bel(AuB) > Bel(A). (10)
If B (X A, then AU B D A. But if A U B ^ 0, then A U B would be the largest
belief with maximum element subset; a contradiction.
The claim that exactly one relation holds can also be analogously proved.
4.3 Generalization
Theorem 4.3 Let Ak be the kth largest belief with minimum (maximum) element
subset o/0. Then L = [Aq, A\, A2, ..., Ai] is a sequence of hypotheses in descend-
ing order by their belief values; where Aq = 0. Then, for any k, (1 < k < I),
exactly one of the following relations holds.
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1. Ak+ i C Ay
2. Ak H Ak+\ = 0, and Ak U A^+i = Aj, for some j, < j < k.
3. Ak H Afc+i 7^ 0, and Ak U Afc+i = Aj, /or 5077ie j, < j < k.
Proof: The proof procedure is similar to the above. If none of the relations holds,
Ak U Ak+i, being different from Ak, would be in the sequence before Ak.
{a,b,c}
.4(1.0)
{«.*}
{a}^.3(.3) {6}V.0(.0) {c}^.2(.2)
Figure 1: An example to demonstrate the relationships among hypotheses or-
dered by their belief values; where = {a,b,c}, the numbers before the paren-
theses are m(X), and the numbers in the parentheses are Bel(X).
An example will help to understand the essence of Theorem 4.3. Suppose
that = {a,b,c} and that the (combined) basic probability assignment is as
follows: m({a}) = .3, m({c}) = .2, m({a,6}) = .1, m(0) = .4, m(X) =
.0, for all other X C 0. Then, it is straightforward to calculate Bel(A)(A C 0)
from m. The results are shown in Fig. 1. Therefore, [0, {a,c}, {a, 6}, {a}, {c}}
is the sequence of the ordered hypotheses; according to the kth largest belief with
minimum element subsets. Now, it is easy to check that, for any k (1 < k < 4),
either Ak+i C Ak, or there exists j such that < j < k, and Ak+i U Ak = Aj.
5 The Decision Making Procedure
In this section, we begin with some observations and intuitions behind decision
making processes at the end of evidence gathering and aggregation. Then, we
move on to derive the sufficient conditions under which a sound decision can be
made. For other cases where the conditions are not met, a heuristic combination
function is proposed to make the final choice. The coefficients in the heuristic
function can be learned to best fit the domain under investigation. Based on
the theoretical derivations and the heuristic combination function proposed, an
algorithm for decision making is given. Finally, some comments concerning the
algorithm and empirical experiments are made.
5.1 Intuitions and observations
Suppose that, after gathering and aggregating available evidence, an expert sys-
tem has the following quantities: m(h), Bel(h), Pl(h), for all h C 0. If h is
chosen as the final output, what can be said about the property or character-
istics of ho in terms of m, Bel, Pit Since m, Bel, PI are numerical values, it
amounts to asking what relations should hold between the chosen hypothesis ho
and all other hypotheses expressed in m, Bel, PL The following are some intu-
itive observations. (Note: since the interval notation is often, and easily used,
the following relations do not contain m.)
• If Bel(hi) > Bel(h 2 ), then hi is more probable than h 2 as the final output.
• If Pl(hi) > Pl(h2 ), then hi has more potential to become more probable
than h2 as the final output.
• Thus, if both Bel(hi) > Bel(h 2 ) and Pl(hi) > Pl{h 2 ), then hi should be
preferred to h 2 as the final output given the current available evidence.
Unfortunately, though, it is not always possible to have both Bel(hi) >
Bel(h 2 ) and Pl(hi) > Pl(h 2 ) satisfied for some hi and h 2 . Thus, we will next
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derive the conditions that guarantee the satisfaction of both inequality relations.
As it is known, every interval converges to a point, i.e., Bel(h) = Pl(h) if given
complete information. In this case, decision making reverts to probability theory.
Another intuition is that a more specific hypothesis A is always preferred to
a more general hypothesis A' if they have the same probability interval, i.e., if
Bel(A) = Bel(A'), Pl(A) = PZ(A'), and A C A'. The reason is simple; the more
specific the hypothesis, the more informative it is.
5.2 Sufficient conditions for sound decision making
Given the formal relationships among ordered hypotheses derived in the last sec-
tion, we can show that certain numerical relations exist among them as well,
under certain conditions. These conditions are then considered to be the suffi-
cient conditions to make a sound decision, according to the above intuitions and
observations.
Theorem 5.1 IfA is the largest belief with minimum (maximum) element subset
of Q , B the second largest belief with minimum (maximum) element subset ofQ,
and A ^ B , then
Pl(A) > Pl(B) (11)
holds for the following two cases:
1. B C A.
2. AD B - 0, AU B = 0.
Proof: Each case is dealt with separately.
Case 1: B C A.
From B C A, we have -ul C ->B. Thus, Bel(-»A) < Bel(-^B) from the definition
of Bel(X). By the definition of Pl(X),
Pl(A) = l-Bel(-iA) (12)
Pl(B) = l-Bel(^B) (13)
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thus, Pl(A) > Pl(B) foUows from Bel(-^A) < Bel(-^B).
Case 2: A n B = 0, A U £ = 0.
Then, -.A = B and -.£ = A. Thus,
P/(A) = 1 - Bel(^A) = 1 - Bel(B) (14)
PJ(J3) = 1 - Bel{pB) = 1 - Bel(A) (15)
Therefore, Bc/(A) > Bel(B) impHes P/(A) > Pl(B). D
As it should be noticed, this theorem essentially establishes the sufficient
conditions to make both Bel(hi) > Bel(h 2 ) and Pl(hi) > Pl(h 2 ) satisfied simul-
taneously for some hi and h 2 .
Given that A is the largest belief with minimum element subset of 0, B the
second largest belief with minimum element subset of 0, and A ^ B, Corollary 4.1
(thus, Theorem 4.1) says that one and only one of the three relations between A
and B must hold. Theorem 5.1 dictates, however, that, for two out of the three
cases that one relation holds, both Bel(A) > Bel(B) and Pl(A) > Pl{B) are
satisfied simultaneously.
Unfortunately, a generalization of Theorem 5.1, unlike its counterpart Theo-
rem 4.3, is weaker, as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2 Let Ak be the kth largest belief with minimum (maximum) element
subset o/0. Then L = [A
, Ai,A 2 , -.-iAi] is a sequence of hypotheses in descend-
ing order by their belief values; where Aq = 0. Then, for any k, (1 < k < I),
Pl(Ak ) > Pl(Ak+1 ) (16)
holds if
Ak+1 C Ak . (17)
Although Theorem 5.2 is weaker than its counterpart Theorem 4.3, it should
be noticed that it only gives the sufficient conditions to make both Bel(hi) >
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Bel(h 2 ) and Pl(hi) > Pl(h 2 ) satisfied simultaneously. In other words, for case
2 and 3 in Theorem 4.3, it is still possible that both Bel(hi) > Bel(h 2 ) and
Pl(hi) > Pl(h 2 ) are satisfied at the same time. However, we cannot count on
the chances. Fortunately, the decision making algorithm designed later in the
paper will correctly and automatically take care of all the cases in Theorem 4.3
if the heuristic combination function has the property that, if both Bel(hi) >
Bel(h 2 ) and Pl{hi) > Pl(h 2 ), then hi is preferred to h 2 by the heuristic function
evaluation. This is a natural requirement for a heuristic combination function to
be rational (see discussion about heuristic combination functions.)
5.3 Heuristic combination functions for decision making
When the derived sufficient conditions among hypotheses are not met, it is not
guaranteed that both Bel(hi) > Bel(h 2 ) and Pl(hi) > Pl(h 2 ) are satisfied at the
same time; and, thus, the final choice must be selected based on some heuristic
combination function of Bel(h) and Pl{h).
There are several concerns about the properties or forms of heuristic combi-
nation functions.
1. Rationality. If both Bel(hi) > Bel(h 2 ) and Pl(h x ) > Pl{h 2 ), then hi must
be preferred to h 2 by the heuristic evaluation; that is, if / is a heuristic function,
then it must be the case that f(hi) > f{h 2 ).
2. Hard evidence. Because that Bel(h) represents the supportive evidence
whereas Pl(h) only represents the potentials (it also represents doubt in h since
Pl[h) = 1 — Bel(->h)), the heuristic combination functions should give more
weights to Bel(h) than to Pl(h), unless otherwise required by the domain and
specified by the user.
3. Distributions. If the distribution of convergent points (where Bel(h) =
Pl(h)) is known, the heuristic combination functions should take it into consid-
eration. But these distributions are hardly available.
4. Simplicity. A simple function f(h), e.g., a linear combination of Bel(h)
and Pl(h), is preferred to a complex one, unless other information about the
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domain, e.g., distributions of convergent points, indicate otherwise.
Among these concerns, only the rationality requirement is strongly suggested
and others are dependent upon the circumstances in the question.
The following is an example of a generic heuristic combination function which
meets the above mentioned concerns.
f(h) = cBel(h) + (1 - c)Pl(h), where 0.5 < c < 1. (18)
Clearly, if both Bel(h x ) > Bel(h 2 ) and Pl^) > Pl{h 2 ), f(h x ) > f(h 2 ). Thus,
the rationality requirement is met. Since c > 0.5, Bel(h) gets more weight than
Pl(h). No distribution is known. And finally, it is a simple linear function. The
coefficient c in this simple heuristic combination function may vary drastically
for different domains; e.g., in medical diagnosis, one may want to assign a high
value for c since the result may be a life-and-death issue.
5.4 Learning the coefficients of heuristics
To improve diagnostic accuracy, the coefficients in the heuristic combination func-
tion can be adjusted through learning to best fit the domain under investigation.
To do so, a set of solved cases is used to train the heuristic combination function
so that the optimal values for the coefficients in the function are found. Con-
straints on the coefficients can be imposed before the training. For example, for
the linear heuristic combination function above, a set of solved cases may help to
find that the best value of c is 0.65.
5.5 The decision making algorithm
The combination of the theoretical derivations and the generic heuristic proposed
results in the following effective decision making algorithm for Dempster- Shafer
theory. Note that the algorithm, by default, works on the most specific hypothe-
ses, unless requested otherwise.
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Algorithm:.
1. Sort out all the hypotheses according to their current belief values: Bel(h).
2. If most general hypotheses preferred, then arrange the hypotheses according
to their generality; and denote the final sorted list by L = [Ai,j4.2, ..., Ai].
3. Otherwise, (i.e., most specific hypothesis preferred), then eliminate all A'
if there exists A such that Bel(A) = Bel(A') and A C A'; and denote the
final sorted list by L — [j4i,i4.2, ..., A{\.
4. If / = 1, then output Ai as the final choice; and stop. 1
5. Test the sufficient conditions; if any of the sufficient conditions is satisfied,
then let T = Aj_i. If / = 2, then output A\ (a sound decision) and stop.
6. Otherwise, let T = Heuristics.evaluation(f,Ai_i,Ai).
7. Remove Ai_i and Ai from Z, and append T to L at the end.
8. 1 = 1-1.
9. Goto step 4.
Procedure Heuristics.evaluation(f, hi, h 2 )
/* / is a user-supplied heuristic combination function */
If /(/ii) > f(h2 ) then
return hi
else return h2
Now let us see how the algorithm correctly and automatically takes care of
all the cases in Theorem 4.3. If the heuristic combination function in proce-
dure Heuristics-evaluationQ has the rationality property, then, whenever both
x The algorithm can be easily modified to output several equally plausible hypotheses.
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Bel(hi) > Bel(h2 ) and Pl(hi) > Pl(h 2 ), hi will prevail even if the sufficient con-
ditions are not satisfied. It means that the rationality property of these functions
captures all the cases which the sufficient conditions miss.
Let us apply the algorithm to the example in Fig. 1. First, assume that we
use the linear combination function denned in (18) with c = 0.6. That is;
f(h) = 0.6 * Bel(h) + 0.4 * Pl(h) (19)
Then the computation of various quantities is carried out and the results are
shown in Table 1.
h m(h) Bel(h) Pl(h) f(h)
{a,c} 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.70
{a, b} 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.56
{a} 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.50
{c} 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.36
Table 1: An example to illustrate the decision making algorithm
Going through the algorithm with these numbers in Table 1 results in {a, c}
being the final output. Note that {a,c} and {a, 6} do not satisfy the sufficient
conditions; but, since Bel({a,c}) > Bel({a,b}) and Pl({a,c}) > P/({a,6}),
{a,c} is the preferred choice by the heuristic evaluation. This is an instance
where the rationality property of the heuristic combination function captures
what the sufficient conditions missed.
5.6 Comments and Experiments
To briefly summarize, the contributions of the theoretical derivations of various
results and the proposed framework to set up heuristic combination functions are
several-fold. First, the sufficient conditions precisely identify the cases when a
decision making is sound. If such a case arises in practice, one can have complete
confidence believing the final output (Step 5). Without such theoretical results,
one can never be sure. Heuristics alone can never guarantee anything. Second,
the sufficient conditions directly relate to and indirectly lead to the rationality
16
requirement for heuristic combination functions. Third, some formal relation-
ships among hypotheses are made clear and explicit by various theorems. Those
relationships among hypotheses are certainly the basis for further investigation
of this problem and some other problems of the theory. Forth, the heuristic pro-
posed provides a flexible framework for setting up heuristic combination functions
to meet different needs. Fifth, the decision making algorithm devised is easy to
implement in practical systems. Some projects are being planned to make use of
this decision making algorithm for various domains.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we addressed an important problem for reasoning under uncertainty
in Dempster-Shafer framework - the decision making procedure. It is important
because an expert system has to make a final decision at the end of informa-
tion gathering and combination. After Dempster-Shafer theory was introduced,
the open problem of effective decision making procedure for the theory was then
identified and discussed. To propose solutions to the problem, some formal rela-
tionships among ordered hypotheses were presented and proved. Based on these
formal relationships among hypotheses, the sufficient conditions for sound de-
cision making were derived. In case of the sufficient conditions not being met,
heuristic combination functions were proposed to make the final choice. The
properties or forms of these functions were emphasized. From the theoretical
results and the heuristic proposed, an effective decision making algorithm for
Dempster-Shafer theory was devised.
For future studies, we are to apply this decision making algorithm to various
domains and to propose specific heuristic combination functions for them. Doing
so may allow us to further characterize the heuristic combination functions in a
greater detail.
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